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ARTICLES 
CO-USE OF COMPATIBLE PRIVATE 
EASEMENTS BY CABLE TELEVISION 
FRANCHISEES UNDER THE 1984 CABLE 
ACT: FEDERAL REFINEMENT OF AN 
ESTABLISHED RIGHT 
By RICHARD D. HARMON 
It is undeniable that cable television has become increas-
ingly important to contemporary society. As cablecasters have 
refined and expanded their service, viewer demand has grown 
steadily over the years, and is now at an all-time high. 1 
Much of cable television's progress can be attributed to 
passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. The 
Act had a number of goals, including the following: 
• [E]stablish franchise procedures and stan-
dards which encourage the growth and 
development of cable systems .... 2 
• [A]ssure that cable communications pro-
vide and are encouraged to provide the 
widest possible diversity of information 
sources and services to the public.3 
• [Plromote competition in cable commu-
nications .... 4 
The Legislative History of the 1984 Cable Act also reveals' 
that Congress' purpose was, in part, to foster "the First 
©1992 by Richard D. Harmon. Mr. Harmon is a member of the California Bar, 
and is in private practice in San Francisco, emphasizing communications law. 
1. The Cable TV Financial Data Book (June, 1991) (A Paul Kagan PUblication). 
2. 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1984). 
3. 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (1984). 
4. 47 U.S.C. § 521(6) (1984). 
1 
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Amendment's goal of a robust marketplace of ideas - an envi-
ronment of 'many tongues speaking many voices'."5 
Before the Cable Act became law, a number of obstacles had 
retarded cable television's growth and development. One such 
obstacle involved private landowners, especially real estate 
developers and landlords.6 By the 1980s, many developers 
were attempting to physically exclude franchised cable tele-
vision disseminators from their developments so that the 
resulting captive audience could be served, on an exclusive 
basis, by the developer or someone with whom the developer 
had contracted. These exclusionary practices represented a seri-
ous problem, since it is estimated that half of all new residential 
construction in the United States is now in the form of planned 
or multiple-dwelling unit (MDU) type developments. 7 
By 1984, some state decisions had applied standard prin-
ciples of easement law to largely solve the problems created by 
attempts to exclude franchised cable television firms from 
residential developments. These state easement cases hold 
that, if a landowner has granted an easement across private 
property which is compatible with the uses to which cable 
television would put the easement, the easement holder can 
subsequently apportion the easement and allow cable televi-
sion to co-use the easement, without landowner consent.S In 
California, such easement cases were first discussed and 
applied in Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television. 9 
The Salvaty case involved a private telephone easement. 
Pursuant to a request from a franchised cable television firm, 
the telephone company-as it is required to do under California 
law10 - had apportioned its easement so that the cable tele-
vision firm could co-use the easement. Mr. Salvaty, the owner 
of the land over which the private easement ran, objected and 
filed suit against the utility and the cable firm. Mr. Salvaty 
claimed that the cable firm was required to obtain his consent 
5. 5 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News, at 4656 (1984). 
6. In the interest of brevity, the term "developer" shall sometimes be used to refer 
to developers, landlords, and others who control access to residential developments 
and multiple-dwelling unit facilities, especially during the construction phase. 
7. E.g., Report, Community Association Institute (June 26, 1987). In such 
developments, the developer often maintains a measure of control over access for a sub-
stantial period of time. 
8. Salvaty V. Falcon Cable Television, 165 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803-05 (1985). 
9. 165 Cal. App. 3d 798 (1985), Cal. Sup. Ct. rev. denied, May 15, 1985. 
10. Cal. Public Utilities Code § 767.5 (1980). 
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before it could co-use the subject easement. The trial court sus-
tained a demurrer, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed, 
holding that, once the easement arose, a compatible user could 
make co-use of the easement without the consent of the 
landowner.ll With the following words, the Salvaty court also 
rejected a claim that co-use of a compatible, private easement 
by the cable television firm constituted a taking under Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. :12 
Unlike the case at bench, there was no ease-
ment of any kind involved in Loretto. Here, 
we have an easement and the cable equip-
ment was within the scope of that ease-
ment.ls 
By adopting Section 621(a)(2) of the 1984 Cable Act,t4Congress 
acknowledged, among other things, that franchised cable television 
firms have a right to co-use any compatible easement on private 
property.16 Congress went one step further than Salvaty, and also 
11. 165 Cal. App. 3d at 804-05. 
12. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
13. 165 Cal. App. 3d at 805. 
14. In pertinent part, Section 621(a)(2), which is codified at § 541(a)(2) of Title 
47 of the United States Code, reads as follows: 
(a)(2) Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the 
construction of a cable system over public rights-of-way, 
and through easements, which is [sic) within the area to be 
served by the cable system and which have been dedicated 
for compatible uses. 
15. Cable television franchise rights usually arise pursuant to municipal ordi-
nance. Regardless of their source, franchises are contractual in nature, and thus give 
rise to all property rights associated with contracts as well as with ordinance enti-
tlement. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. American Television Communication Corp., 98 
Cal. App. 3d 27,31 (1979). Section 621(a)(2) provides that a cable television firm is 
entitled - as part of its franchise-based property rights - to co-use not only the pub-
lic rights of way, but also all compatible, private easements, as needed to provide ser-
vice. In the few cases where cable television's co-use of compatible easements has been 
judicially resisted, the court erroneously focused on the property rights of the land 
owner, without appreciating the cable firm's equal right to co-use compatible ease-
ments. This erroneous focus has caused a few courts to describe easement co-use with 
loaded phrases such as "forced access," "mandatory access," "compelled access" and 
"piggy-backing." E.g., Media General Cable v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-
Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 908 (E.D. Va. 1990) ("compelled access"). Such loaded phras-
es are inaccurate. When a cable television firm invokes § 621 (a)(2), it is exercising 
a franchise-based property right and is not impairing the legitimate rights of any other 
party. Mischaracterization and erroneous analysis can be avoided if the neutral 
phrase "co-use of compatible easements" is adopted by courts confronting these 
issues. In this way, the property rights of cable television franchisees will receive the 
same level of protection as the property rights of landowners. 
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made it illegal for holders of compatible, private easements to 
refuse to apportion. 16 The 1984 Cable Act, in other words, 
made it unlawful for developers to arrange exclusive ease-
ments regarding cable television service facilities. Since res-
idential developments normally contain a number of easements 
which are compatible with cable television uses - especially 
if another cable television service provider has been allowed 
access to the development - Section 621(a)(2) went far toward 
remedying the problem of developers' exclusionary practices. 
The legislative proposal which became the 1984 Cable Act 
originally had another provision - § 633 - which was not an 
easement co-use provision. 17 Section 633 was a tenants' rights 
clause. It provided that, where there was no easement of any 
kind, tenants in apartment buildings could still demand cable 
television service. Under § 633, if tenants made such a demand, 
16. The Legislative History to § 621(a)(2) states, inter alia, that "[a]ny private 
arrangements which seek to restrict a cable system's use of such easements or rights 
of way which have been granted to other utilities are in violation of this Section and 
not enforceable." House Report at 59, reprinted at 5 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. 
News, at 4696 (1984). Elsewhere in the Legislative History, Congress made it clear 
that utility easements were only an example of the types of easements which would 
be compatible with cable television uses. ld. 
17. The unenacted § 633 was a consumer-oriented proposal, and read as follows: 
CONSUMER ACCESS TO CABLE SERVICE 
(a) The owner of any multiple-unit residential or commer-
cial building or manufactured home park may not prevent or 
interfere with the construction or installation of facilities nec-
essary for a cable system, consistent with this section, if 
cable service or other communications service has been 
requested by a lessee or owner (including a person who owns 
shares which entitle such person to occupy a unit in a coop-
erative project) of a unit in such building or park. 
(b) (1) A State or franchising authority may, and the 
Commission shall, prescribe regulations which provide -
(A) that the safety, functioning, and appearance of 
the premises and the convenience and safety of other 
persons not be adversely affected by the installation or 
construction of facilities necessary for a cable system; 
(B) that the cost of the installation, construction, oper-
ation, or removal of such facilities be borne by the 
cable operator or subscriber, or a combination of both; 
(C) that the owner be justly compensated by the cable 
operator for any damages caused by the installation, 
construction, operation, or removal of such facilities by 
the cable operator; and 
(D) methods for determining just compensation under 
this section. 
(2) A State or franchising authority may make the reg-
ulations prescribed by the Commission applicable 
within such entity's jurisdiction. 
4
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landlords had to honor the tenants' request. IS The trigger 
mechanism for the tenants' -rights provision was a demand 
for a franchisee's cable television service by a tenant. 19 This 
type of trigger is the exact opposite of the easement co-use pro-
vision now contained in § 621(a)(2), which is triggered by a 
cable firm's decision to exercise its property right to co-use a 
compatible easement. Since entry by a cable firm in the 
(c) Any owner of such a multiple,unit building or park may 
not demand or accept payment from any cable operator in 
exchange for permitting construction with or installation of 
facilities necessary for a cable system on or within the 
premises in excess of any amount which constitutes just 
compensation. 
(d) In prescribing methods under subsection (b)(1)(D) for 
determining just compensation, consideration shall be given 
to-
(1) the extent to which the cable system facilities 
occupy the premises; 
(2) the actual long· term damage which the cable sys-
tem facilities may cause to the premises; 
(3) the extent to which the cable system facilities 
would interfere with the normal use and enjoyment of 
the premises; and 
(4) the enhancement in value of the premises result-
ing from the availability of services provided over the 
cable system. 
(e) (1) During the period for which regulations by a State or 
franchising authority are not otherwise in effect under sub-
section (b), regulations of the Commission shall apply with 
respect to the cable system involved. 
(2) Regulations under subsection (b) shall be pre-
scribed not later than 180 days after the effective 
date of this title. 
(f) This section shall take effect on the 180th day after the 
effective date of this title. 
(g) The preceding provisions of this section shall not apply 
to units which are customarily leased to a person of less 
than 30 days and to units in a hospital. 
(h) (1) This section shall not apply to any owner of a mul-
tiple unit residential or commercial building or manufactured 
home park who makes available to residents a diversity of 
information sources and services equivalent to those offered 
by the cable system authorized to provide cable service in the 
area in which such building or park is located, as deter-
mined under rules prescribed by the Commission. 
(2) The Commission shall prescribe rules to carry 
out the provisions of paragraph (1) not later than 180 
days after the effective date of this title. (emphasis 
added). 
18. An exception existed where the landlord provided "equivalent" cable service 
to that offered by the franchised cable company. However, since § 633 was not enact-
ed, it is apparent that Congress rejected the single-supplier scenarios embodied in the 
unenacted § 633. 
19. See former § 633(a), supra, note 17. 
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absence of easements (or some easement-like arrangement) 
would not normally involve a compatible use or the exercise of 
a cable firm's existing franchise-based property rights, § 633 
had no relation to § 621(a)(2). 
Section 633 was ultimately rejected by Congress. However, 
the elimination of the tenants'-rights provision from the final 
version of the Act had no impact on the scope and reach of the 
unrelated easement co-use provision in § 621(a)(2), or on the 
goals and purposes of the Cable Act itself. Section 621(a)(2) 
provides that franchised cable television companies, as a part 
of their franchise property rights, are authorized to construct 
their cable systems not only "over public rights-of-way," but also 
"through easements ... dedicated for compatible uses." The Act 
makes no distinction between easements in the interiors of 
buildings and easements outside buildings - it provides that 
franchised cable television disseminators can obtain access to 
all easements dedicated for compatible uses. 
Some landowner interests have resisted § 621(a)(2), even 
though it reflects well-established easement law. Their most 
common litigation arguments are as follows: 
1. There is no private right of action to 
enforce § 621(a)(2). 
2. That - since state easement law allegedly 
does not allow co-use of compatible ease-
ments on private property - § 621(a)(2) 
only applies to classic, publicly dedicat-
ed easements. 
3. The non-enactment of § 633 of the Act 
means that § 621(a)(2) cannot apply to 
the interiors ofMDU structures, such as 
apartment buildings or condominium 
facilities. 
4. That, in any event, a cable franchisee's 
co-use on a compatible easement or pri-
vate property constitutes a "taking" for 
which just compensation is due. 
Some of the landowners' arguments intertwine. For exam-
ple, it has been argued that, since the unenacted § 633 was 
purportedly the only section which contained a just 
compensation provision, the deletion of § 633 reveals a "leg-
islative intent" to not allow co-use of private easements. As 
6
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explained below, the arguments of landowner interests have 
each been rejected by the majority of courts confronting these 
issues under § 621(a)(2). Although § 621(a)(2) issues are now 
being actively litigated in district courts in the Ninth Circuit,20 
the Ninth Circuit itself has not had occasion to interpret or 
apply § 621(a)(2) as of this writing. 
A. COURTS HAVE HELD THAT A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION DOES 
EXIST 
In Centel Cable Television Co. of Florida v. Admiral's Cove 
Assoc., Ltd.,21 the Eleventh Circuit held that a private right of 
action exists to enforce § 621(a)(2), and several district courts 
have agreed. 22 The private-right-of-action issue thus appears 
to be resolved, and those opposed to vigorous enforcement of § 
621(a)(2) are no longer actively pursuing the point in con-
temporary easement co-use litigation. 
B. STATE EASEMENT LAW ALLOWS CO-USE OF COMPATIBLE 
PRIVATE EASEMENTS 
In discussing the easement co-use provision of § 621(a)(2), 
it is appropriate to begin with the law of easements. An ease-
ment is not a document; it is a right - an irrevocable, incor-
poreal right to engage in some activity on the land of another.23 
Such a right arises if a landowner allows certain activities on 
the land at issue.24 No special form of words is required to 
create an irrevocable right of use (i.e., an easement).25 
20. E.g., Heritage Cableuision of California, Inc. u. J.F. Shea Co., et al., No. C-
90-20073(WAI) (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 8, 1990) (LEXIS, 18811); United Artists Cable 
Teleuision of Santa Cruz, Inc. u. Blue Pacific Mobile Home Park, et al., No. C-91-20451 
JW (N.D. Cal., filed July 31,1991); Booth American Co. u. Total TV ofVictoruille, No. 
CV-91-2286-RSWL (C.D. Cal. 1991) (partial summary judgment ruling in favor of fran-
chised cable television firm's co-use of compatible private easements announced on 
January 13, 1992). 
21. 835 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1988); Accord, Centel Cable Teleuision Co. of Florida 
u. Thos. J. White Deuelopment Corp., 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1990). 
22. E.g., Cable TV Fund 14·A, Ltd. u. Property Owners Ass'n Chesapeake Ranch 
Estates, Inc., 706 F.Supp. 422, 429 (D. Md. 1989). 
23. 28 Cal. Jur. 3d, Easements & Licenses, § 1 (1986). 
24. Id., at 80. (The right ofuse is "created by grant or agreement, express or implied, 
which confers a right on its owner to some ... use ... over the estate of another.") 
25. Scanlan u. Hopkins, 128 Vt. 626, 629, 270 A.2d 352, 355 (1970). Some 
landowners have recently attempted to evade § 621(a)(2) by manipulating service 
agreements with competitors of cable franchisees, sometimes even to the extent of including 
words to the effect that the agreement "is not an easement." However, nomenclature 
is not controlling, and substance will prevail over form. If any service provider is 
permitted to provide cable television-type service, an easement arises. Congress has 
forbidden private arrangements to exclude franchised cable firms. Attempts to 
7
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Easements can greatly benefit the landowners' property.26 
Easements also convey to the easement holder an interest in 
real property.27 The land over which the easement runs is 
traditionally referred to as the "servient estate" or "servient 
tenement."28 If another parcel of land is benefitted by the 
easement, it is referred to as the "dominant" estate or tenement, 
and the easement is considered to be "appurtenant."29 If an 
easement benefits another person or entity, rather than a 
dominant estate, it is a "personal interest in the land of 
another," and is referred to as an "easement in groSS."30 
It is common for private easements in gross to exist on 
private property.3! While utility companies often hold private 
easements in gross, the utilities are not the only holders of such 
easements.32 In the context of cable television, the only rele-
vant easements will ordinarily be easements in gross, although 
§ 621(a)(2) is not restricted solely to easements in gross. For 
example, easements appurtenant may be involved. 
It is well-established under state easement law that fran-
chised cable television disseminators can co-use private, com-
patible easements in gross if they impose no greater burden on 
the easements; an absence of additional burden is presumed 
when easements are "exclusive."33 In this context, "exclusive" 
means that the landowner granting the easement has not 
reserved a right to also use the easement for the same type of 
activity in which the easement holder intends to engage. M In 
characterize access arrangements in a way which will -thwart the intent of the Cable 
Act" are not tolerated. Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Devel. Corp., 902 
F.2d 905, 909 (11th Cir. 1990). 
26. For example, allowing for a competing, franchised cable television service 
would add an amenity to an apartment complex, expand viewer choice and enhance 
marketability. 
27. 28 Cal. Jur.3d, supra, § 1 at 79, n.2, citing Darr v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 
94 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157 Cal. Rptr. 90 (3rd Dist., 1979). 
28. 28 Cal. Jur. 3d, supra, § 7. 
29. Id., at 90. 
30. Id., at 90-91. 
31. See, e.g., Salvaty, supra, 165 Cal. App 3d at 803-05; Witteman v. Jack Barry 
Cable TV, 228 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1987). Witteman is 
still useful for scholarly purposes, although, due to a unique procedural history, the 
opinion is technically de published at this time. 
32. See, e.g., Witteman, supra, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 586 (In addition to the telephone 
utility, which had a private easement in gross, the city also had a cable-access easement); 
Heritage Cablevision of California, Inc. v. J.F. Shea CO.,Inc., et al., No. C-90-20073 WAI 
(N.D. Cal., June 4, 1990) (Lexis, 18811) (Preliminary Injunction Order discussing ease-
ments in gross held by a second franchised cable television firm). 
33. See, e.g., Salvaty, supra, 165 Cal. App 3d at 803-05. 
34. Witteman v. Jack Barry Cable TV, supra, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 588; Henley v. 
Continental Cablevision of St. Louis County, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Mo. App. 1985). 
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cable television cases, it is rare to have an easement in gross 
which is not exclusive in this sense. This fact is not surprising. 
Few landowners desire to compete in such easements with util-
ity companies or other, similar easement holders. In Witteman, 
for example, the landowner "had no intention to provide utility 
services" in the utility easements at issue, and thus the easements 
in Witteman were exclusive for purposes of apportionment.36 
If a franchisee imposes no additional burden on an ease-
ment, then, under the theory of apportionment, it can co-use 
the easement.36 The landowner's consent is not needed for such 
compatible co-use to occur.37 Moreover, utility companies in 
some states cannot refuse to apportion their private ease-
ments to cable television franchisees. 38 The California 
Legislature, for instance, has enacted Section 767.5 of the 
Public Utilities Code, which regulates commercial conduct in 
a way which prohibits utility companies and landowners from 
entering into exclusive contracts designed to keep cable-
casters from co-using compatible easements.39 
35. Witteman, supra, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 588. 
36. Salvaty, supra, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 803-04; Witteman supra, 228 Cal. Rptr. 
at 587-88. 
37. Salvaty, supra, 165 Cal. App 3d at 804-05. 
38. See, e.g., Cal. Public Utilities Code § 767.5 (1980); see also Witteman, supra, 228 
Cal. Rptr. at 589. Section 621(a)(2) federalizes this rule. See note 16 supra. The rule 
against refusals to apportion does not involve a taking. For example, the landowner and 
the easement holder can be analogized to a landlord and tenant. The rule prohibiting 
refusals to apportion is merely a regulation of the economic relations of a landlord and 
tenant. Government, of course, has "broad power to regulate ... the landlord tenant rela-
tionship ... without paying compensation .... " Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982). Accordingly, once a developer creates an easement, it 
can no longer assert that co-use of compatible easements is not allowed: a compatible 
use has been authorized by the landlord, and both the landlord and tenant thus become 
subject to economic regulation. Salvaty, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at 805. Section 621(a)(2) 
is a classic example of such regulation. Section 621(a)(2) has established a statutory 
scheme whereby the grant of an easement which would be compatible with cable tele-
vision is deemed-at the time of the grant-to also be a grant to local franchisees, by 
operation oflaw. For this reason, such easements are, in essence, pre-apportioned, multi-
compatible-user easements. Franchisees thus need not approach the easement-holder 
for apportionment; apportionment already exists. Accordingly, § 621(a)(2) takes noth-
ing from holders of compatible easements, nor from landowners, who voluntarily 
allowed the use at issue. Salvaty. 
39. In pertinent part, § 767.5 of the Utilities Code reads as follows: 
Authority To Regulate Public Utility Pole 
Attachments For Cable Television 
(a) As used in this section: 
(1) "Public Utility" includes any person, firm, or 
corporation, except a publicly owned public utility, which owns 
controls, or in combination jointly owns or controls, support 
structures or rights-of-way used or useful, in whole or in part, 
for wire communication. 
9
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(2) "Support structure" includes, but is not limited to; a 
utility pole, anchor, duct, conduit, manhole, or handhole. 
(3) "Pole attachment" means any attachment to surplus 
space, or use of excess capacity, by a cable television corpo-
ration for a wire communication system on or in any support 
structure located on or in any right-of-way or easement 
owned, controlled, or used by a public utility. 
(4) "Surplus space" means that portion of the usable 
space on a utility pole which has the necessary clearance 
from other pole users, as required by the orders and regula-
tions of the commission, to allow its use by a cable television 
corporation for a pole attachment. 
(5) "Excess capacity" means volume or capacity in a 
duct, conduit, or support structure other than a utility pole 
or anchor which can be used, pursuant to the orders and 
regulations of the commission, for a pole attachment. 
(6) "Usable space" means the total distance between the 
top of the utility pole and the lowest possible attachment point 
that provides the minimum allowable vertical clearance. 
(7) "Minimum allowable vertical clearance" means the 
minimum clearance for communication conductors along 
rights-of-way or other areas as specified in the orders and reg-
ulations of the commission. 
(8) "Rearrangements" means work performed, at the 
request of a cable television corporation, to, on, or in an 
existing support structure to create such surplus space or 
excess capacity as is necessary to make it usable for a pole 
attachment. When an existing support structure does not 
contain adequate surplus space or excess capacity and can-
not be so rearranged as to create the required surplus space 
or excess capacity for a pole attachment, "rearrangements" 
shall include replacement, at the request of the cable televi-
sion corporation, of the support structure in order to provide 
adequate surplus space or excess capacity. 
(9) "Annual cost of ownership" means the sum of the 
annual capital costs and annual operation costs of the support 
structure which shall be the average costs of all similar sup-
port structures owned by the public utility. The basis for com-
putation of annual costs shall be historical capital cost less 
depreciation. The accounts upon which the historical capital 
costs are determined shall include a credit for all reimbursed 
capital costs of the public utility. Depreciation shall be based 
upon the average service life of the support structure. As used 
in this paragraph, "annual cost of ownership" shall not include 
costs for any property not necessary for a pole attachment. 
(b) The Legislature finds and declares that public util-
ities have a dedicated portion of such support structures to 
cable television corporations for pole attachments in that 
public utilities have made available, through a course of con-
duct covering many years, surplus space and excess capaci-
ty on and in their support structures for use by cable television 
corporations for pole attachments, and that the provision by 
such public utilities of surplus space and excess capacity for 
such pole attachments is a public utility service delivered by 
public utilities to cable television corporations. The 
Legislature further finds and declares that it is in the inter-
ests of the people of California for public utilities to contin-
ue to make available such surplus space and excess capacity 
for use by cable television corporations. 
[Vol. 22:1 
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To a degree, California's legislative policy reflects a deter-
mination that the public interest is served by "the expansion 
of cable services. "40 Congress has embraced the same policy.41 
Several courts have also recognized that allowing co-use of com-
patible, private easements is appropriate as part of "the nat-
ural evolution of communications technology" uses which have 
already been allowed in various easements by landowners.42 
C. SECTION 621(a)(2) DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR LESS CO-USE OF 
PRIVATE EASEMENTS THAN STANDARD PRINCIPLES OF STATE 
EASEMENT LAW 
The enactment of the 1984 Cable Act must be viewed with 
the above-described principles of conventional easement law 
in mind. With regard to easement co-use, § 621(a)(2) provides 
as follows: 
Any franchise shall be construed to autho-
rize the construction of a cable system ... 
through easements ... which have been 
dedicated for compatible uses .... 
Some developers have argued that § 621(a)(2) should be 
restricted to situations involving public dedications. There are 
numerous indications that § 621(a)(2) is not so limited. 
First, the plain meaning of the language used by Congress 
is not restricted to public dedication situations. Section 
621(a)(2) refers to easements "dedicated for compatible uses," 
not "dedicated for public uses." A fundamental principle of 
statutory interpretation is that the plain meaning of the 
statute should be applied.43 
Moreover, if § 621(a)(2) is confined to formal, publicly ded-
icated easements, then the Section would provide for less 
easement co-use than standard easement law, and would thus 
serve no practical purpose. Since congressional action was not 
needed for cable television to gain access to compatible, 
40. Witteman, supra, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 587 ("the Saluaty court noted that pub-
lic policy strongly favored the expansion of cable services to the public .... "). 
41. 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1984). 
42. Saluaty, supra, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 803, citing Faus u. City of Los Angeles, 67 
Cal.2d 350, 355-58, 62 Cal. Rptr. 193, 431 P.2d 849 (1967); and Norris v. State of 
California ex reI. Dept. of Public Works, 201 Cal. App. 2d 41, 47, 67 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1968). 
43. Perrin u. United States, 444 U.S. 37,42 (1979). 
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publicly dedicated easements, the developers' "public dedica-
tion" argument would relegate § 621(a)(2) to situations where it 
is not needed.« Courts, of course, are to avoid statutory "inter-
pretations which would produce absurd or nugatory results."46 
D. THERE ARE MANY OTHER INDICATIONS THAT SECTION 
621(a)(2) IS NOT RESTRICTED To PUBLIC DEDICATION SITUATIONS 
A public dedication involves a gift of an interest in land, 
accepted by government.46 The public gift feature of dedication 
law also reveals that § 621(a)(2) cannot be confined to public 
dedication situations. The Legislative History states that, 
under § 621(a)(2), "private arrangements which seek to restrict 
a cable system's use of such easements ... which have been 
granted to other utilities are in violation of this Section and not 
enforceable. "47 This language clarifies that the easements 
44. United Cable Television of Mid·Michigan v. Eyde, No. 5:89·CV·403 (File 
No. L·89·30103 CA) [Slip Op. at 5·6] (W.O. Mich. 1989). In relevant part, the Eyde 
court observed as follows: 
The defendants argue that a cable franchisee's access to 
easements under Section 621(a)(2) is limited to publicly 
dedicated ones. See Cable Assoc. v. Town & Country 
Management Corp., 709 F. SUpp. 582, 584 (E.n. Pa. 1989). 
Thus, they argue that even if the statute creates a private 
right of action, United will not succeed on the merits of this 
case because Consumers' easement is a private one which has 
not been publicly dedicated under Michigan state law. 
However, neither the statute nor the legislative history 
supports the defendants' position. First, the language of 
Section 621(a)(2) contains no requirement that the easement 
be dedicated for public use. Second, the legislative history con· 
tains no statements which would support the argument of the 
defendants on this issue. Actually, the legislative history 
supports the conclusion that Congress intended private ease· 
ments to be within the scope of Section 621(a)(2) by stating 
that "[a]ny private arrangements which seek to restrict a cable 
system's use of such easements ... which have been granted 
to other utilities are in violation of this section and unen· 
forceable.· Legislative History at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. 
Code Congo & Admin. News at 4696. If Congress intended to 
permit access to only publicly dedicated easements, there 
would have been no need to include such a statement in the 
legislative history. Thus, the face of the statute does not cre· 
ate a distinction between public and private easements and 
the legislative history indicates that this lack of a distinction 
was intentional. Therefore, the Court rejects the defendants' 
argument that private easements are outside the scope of 
Section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Act. 
[d. (footnote omitted). 
45. Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 1977). 
46. 6A Powell on Real Estate § 926[1] (1992). 
47. 5 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News, at 4696 (1984). 
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being referred to in § 621(a)(2) include, for example, those 
granted to other utilities. An easement granted to a utility is, 
by definition, not a gift to the public. Where the grantee is a 
private easement holder, there is no public dedication. 
Congress' prohibition of "private arrangements" restricting 
easement co-use is also telling. It is difficult to imagine a pri-
vate arrangement which could validly restrict a third party's 
use of compatible, publicly dedicated lands. By prohibiting pri-
vate restrictive arrangements, Congress made it clear that § 
621(a)(2) extends to private easements. 
There are many other indications that § 621(a)(2) is not lim-
ited to instances of public dedication. For example, the FCC, in 
a Notice announcing proposed rules to implement the Cable 
Act, clearly stated that § 621(a)(2) "authorizes construction of a 
cable system over public rights-of-way and through easements 
designated for compatible uses such as those used for utilities. "48 
When asked about its use of the word "designated," the FCC 
rejected restrictive readings of § 621(a)(2), and explained that 
"[o]ur use of the phrase 'dedicated for compatible uses' in the 
Notice was not intended to be more or less encompassing than the 
phrase 'dedicated for compatible uses' used in the Cable Act. "49 
This is a clear indication that, as used in § 621(a)(2), the phrase 
"designated for compatible uses" carried the same meaning as the 
phrase "dedicated for compatible uses" in the Act. 
The basic principles of statutory construction support the 
position of the FCC. The general rule is that "when a word 
which has both a technical and a common and ordinary mean-
ing appears in a statute, the latter meaning will prevail over the 
former in the absence of any indication that the word was used 
. in its technical sense. "60 Rejection of technical meanings is 
especially appropriate when "such a technical definition is not 
supported by the purpose ofthe statute .... "61 Moreover, since 
the word "dedicated" was not defined in the definition section 
of the Cable Act/2 the ordinary meaning should be applied. 63 
48. 49 Fed. Reg. 48769 (1984) (emphasis added). 
49. 50 Fed. Reg. 18647 (1985). 
50. St. Lukes Hasp. Ass'n v. United States, 212 F.Supp. 387, 391-92 (N.D. Ohio 
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 333 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1964). 
51. In re Garner, 18 Bkry. Rptr. 369, 371 (S.D. N.Y. 1982). 
52. The definitions section is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 522. 
53. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) ("A fundamental canon of statu-
tory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as tak-
ing their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning"). 
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There is a common meaning for the word "dedication" 
which differs from the formalistic notion of "public dedica-
tion" which Congress eschewed. To "dedicate" is to: "Set apart 
for a special purpose; devote to some work, duty, etc. "64 This 
more general meaning of the word dedication has been adopt-
ed by most courts when interpreting § 621(a)(2). For example, 
in a recent state court case, Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area 
Cable TV Co., 66 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that cable 
firms were entitled to co-use compatible easements under § 
621(a)(2), whether they are "public" or "private." In the pro-
cess, the Mumaugh court observed: 
The majority of courts that have construed 
the statue have rejected arguments that 47 
U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) grants only a right to con-
struct cable television lines through publicly 
dedicated easements [citing Cable Holdings 
of Georgia, Rollins Cablevue, Cable TV Fund, 
and Greater Worchester Cablevision]. In 
reaching this conclusion, the courts have 
relied on the legislative intent expressed in 
the language of the Cable Act itself and on the 
Legislative History of the Act. 68 
This conclusion is consistent with recent cases applying § 
621(a)(2). In Centel Cable Co. v. Thos. White Devel. Corp.,57 the 
Eleventh Circuit held that, under § 621(a)(2), a franchise 
includes, as a part of the franchise itself, a property right to use 
compatible easements, even if the easements traverse "private 
roads" or cross "private property. "58 
In one case, Cable Associates, Inc. v. Town & Country 
Management Corporation,69 the court concluded that there is 
a general rule favoring technical meanings over the ordinary 
definitions of common words. eo Based on this conclusion, the 
Cable Associates court held that the phrase "dedicated for 
54. Webster's New World Dictionary, at 383 (1969). 
55. 456 N.W.2d 425,429-30 (Mich. App. 1990). 
56. 456 N. W.2d at 428. Accord, Amsat Cable Limited Partnership 111 v. Connecticut 
Superior Ct., 1991 W.L. 49850, at 7 (Mar. 25, 1991 Conn. Super.) (Administrative Court 
held that Cable Act intended the phrase *dedicated for compatible uses- to include both 
public and private easements); Booth American, supra, note 20. 
57. 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1990). 
58. 1d. at 909-10. 
59. 709 F.Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
60. 1d. at 584, citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
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compatible uses" in § 621(a)(2) should be given a technical, 
"legal" definition, and interpreted to apply only to dedications 
for public uses.61 
The case cited by the Cable Associates court as supportive 
of a general proposition favoring technical definitions is 
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan.62 However, there is no gen-
eral rule favoring technical definitions. Indeed, the general rule 
is the exact opposite. The contrary conclusion of the Cable 
Associates court was based on a misapplication of Corning. In 
Corning, the Supreme Court ruled as it did because there was 
ample legislative history in that unique case showing that 
certain phrases were chosen by Congress because they had cer-
tain well-accepted technical meanings in the industrial rela-
tions field, and that Congress wanted such technical meanings 
to apply.s3 Such circumstances do not exist in connection with 
§ 621(a)(2). Indeed, the legislative history of § 621(a)(2) shows 
that a technical, legalistic definition of the phrase "dedicated 
for compatible uses" would be contrary to congressional intent. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the scope of § 621(a)(2) 
embraces private easements, on February 12, 1992 an Eleventh 
Circuit panel reversed Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. 
McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd.,6J. and held that § 621(a)(2) 
is restricted to public dedication situations. 56 In Cable Holdings, 
a landlord had given a firm named ODC Communications per-
mission to provide cable service in a private apartment complex, 
and tried to exclude ODC's competitor, the local franchised cable 
television firm. Applying § 621(a)(2), the district court rejected 
these exclusionary practices. Its decision has now been reversed. 
61. Another case agrees with this distinctly minority view. Media General 
Cable u. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co- Owners, 737 F.Supp. 903, 911 & n.14 
(E.D. Va., 1990). The Cable Associates court felt bound by the holding in Cable 
Inuestments, Inc. u. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 160 (3rd Cir. 1989). However, the Woolley 
holding is irrelevant to § 621(aX2) issues, since Woolley did not involve any easements. 
Media General, supra, 721 F.Supp. at 782 ("the Woolley plaintifTwas seeking access 
to the insides of buildings and apartments where no easements existed-). Both the 
Cable Associates and Media General courts erroneously relied on Woolley to resolve 
§ 621(a)(2) issues. The district court decision in Media General has been appealed to 
the Fourth Circuit. 
62. 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
63. Id. at 201. 
64. 678 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1986) .. 
65. Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. u. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., _, 
F.2d _, No. 91-8032 (11th Cir. 1992). Ironically, a Senior District Judge from the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania-which is the birthplace of this erroneous view-sat 
on the Cable Holdings panel by designation. 
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In the district court, ODC argued that it had no easement-
type arrangements, but only a form of license. The trial court 
rejected this argument. The district court found that ODC's 
license rights constituted an easement for purposes of 
§ 621(a)(2), and this finding was not disturbed on appea1.68 
Accordingly, the facts of Cable Holdings are conceptually iden-
tical to Salvaty. However, the result in Cable Holdings is the 
opposite of that reached in Salvaty and in similar state and fed-
eral easement cases. A review of the opinion of the Cable 
Holdings court reveals the source of this discrepancy. 
The Cable Holdings opinion does not discuss or cite ease-
ment co-use or easement-apportionment cases such as Salvaty. 
This failure to consider conventional easement law led the 
Cable Holdings court to make statements about the law of 
easements which are incorrect. For example, contrary to 
Salvaty and similar cases, the Cable Holdings court stated that 
government cannot authorize co-use of easements "even when 
a property owner has privately allowed other occupations 
which are 'compatible'. . . ."67 
This inaccurate statement of easement law was the well-
spring of an analysis which is erroneous because its premise 
is incorrect. After the Cable Holdings court mistakenly stated 
that co-use of compatible private easements is not allowed, it 
concluded-contrary to Salvaty-that co-use of compatible 
easements involves a "taking" if the subject easements are 
private.88 Accordingly, to avoid this perceived taking problem, 
the Cable Holdings court rendered § 621(a)(2) superfluous by 
restricting it to public dedication situations. 
Due to the incorrect premise underlying the Cable Holdings 
analysis, the court relied heavily on inapposite noneasement 
cases like Loretto and Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley.69 
The Cable Holdings court also discussed the irrelevant 
66. Id., Slip Op. at 1052 n.3. 
67. Id., Slip Op. at 1046 (emphasis in original). No authority was cited by the 
Cable Holdings court for this and similar incorrect statements. 
68. Id., Slip Op. at 1047. Actually, no taking is involved. Saluaty, supra, 165 Cal. App. 
3d at 805. Even if a taking issue does arise in a given, unique case, § 621(a)(2) is consti-
tutional because § 621(aX2XC) authorizes just compensation. See Section G, infra. The Cable 
Holdings court reached a contrary conclusion, but its brief discussion of just compensation 
is based on a misreading ofunenacted § 633, and is incorrect. Eyde, supra note 44. 
69. 867 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1989). The Cable Holdings court also discussed var-
ious alarms raised by ODC, such as the prospect of a government-sanctioned "inva-
sion" of beach property if the district court was affirmed. However, if a beach is 
traversed by an easement, Salvaty would apply, and would cause no difficulty. ODC's 
arguments were either straw-men or not related to real-world problems. 
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provisions of unenacted § 633. These unnecessary excursions 
into Loretto, Woolley and § 633 illustrate that misperceptions 
about substantive easement law can lead to errors in the 
implementation of § 621(a)(2). 
The Cable Holdings court tried to harmonize its decision with 
contrary, earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions, but the flawed 
premise underlying the Cable Holdings analysis prevents such 
reconciliation. For example, in Centel Cable Television Co. v. 
Thos. J. White Devel. Corp.,70 the landowner classified certain 
"rights-of-way as private," and then argued that congressional 
authorization for co-use of private easements "is aper se viola-
tion of the Takings Clause."71 The Thos. J. White court rejected 
this argument,'2 as have other courts in the Eleventh Circuit. The 
Cable Holdings decision thus creates an intra-circuit conflict in 
the Eleventh Circuit, with the Cable Holdings position being held 
by only one court. The issue should therefore be reviewed, in light 
of Salvaty principles, by the Eleventh Circuit en banc.7s 
The only reasonable interpretation of § 621(a)(2) is that it pro-
vides for co-uses of private, compatible easements by cable 
franchisees which are at least as broad as the standard princi-
ples of easement law.74 Such an interpretation of § 621(a)(2) 
would also comport with Congress' stated goals of encouraging 
the expansion of cable television, "competition in cable com-
munications" and "the widest possible diversity of information 
sources and services." 
70. 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1990). 
71. Id. at 909. 
72. Id. at 910-11. 
73. In the meantime, Cable Holdings should be confined to Georgia. Section 
621(a)(2) deals with easements, and adopts a broad view of what constitutes an ease-
ment. The FCC has ruled that application of§ 621(a)(2) in each state should be guid-
ed by "the remedies available" at the "local level," which would include those provided 
by state easement law. 50 Fed. Reg. 18674 n.51 (May 2.,1985). 
74. The minority of courts holding that § 621(a)(2) is confined to public dedication 
situations are discussed at footnote 61 above. These courts also based their conclusions 
on the mistaken belief that easements-in-gross are not apportionable. See, e.g., Media 
General Cable v. Sequcyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 908 
(E.D. Va. 1990) (citing no authority, the district court stated that: "In granting an ease-
ment, whether to a utility or not, the grantor gives the grantee, and no others, specific rights 
to use the underlying property"); Cable Associates, supra note 59, 709 F. Supp. at 586 (cit-
ing no authority, and in conflict with the teachings of cases such as Salvaty, the district 
court stated "that just compensation would be required if Congress mandated that a pri-
vate owner of real property allow access to a franchise [sic] cable operator through a strict-
ly private easement"). The recent decision in Cable Holdings of Georgia contains the same 
error. The correct view has been adopted by the majority of courts. See, e.g., Booth 
American Co. v. Total TV of Victorville, No. CV-91-2286-RSWL (C.D. Cal., Jan. 13, 1992) 
(partial summary judgment allowing co-use of compatible private easements, and reject-
ing a landowner's "public dedication" argument). . 
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E. SECTION 621(a)(2) DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN 
INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR EASEMENTS 
Section 621(a)(2) does not differentiate between the inte-
riors and the exteriors of buildings. Some developers have 
attempted to erect such a distinction by adverting to dictum in 
a case entitled Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley.76 However, 
Woolley did not involve any easements or an attempt by a 
franchised cable firm to co-use a compatible easement.7S The 
Woolley court's holding is thus not relevant to issues under § 
621(a)(2), which relates to situations involving easements and 
easement-like arrangements. 
There is nothing in the law of easements which prevents 
easements from traveling through buildings. Section 621(a)(2) is 
addressed to all compatible easements, whether they 
travel through building interiors or not. As one commentator has 
noted, the municipal "power to franchise would be meaningless 
unless the city could assure its franchisees that the [franchise] it 
grants carries with it the power over the public and [compatible] 
private property necessary to construct a cable system. That 
power is granted in § 621(a)(2) of the Act [47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)]."77 
F. JUST COMPENSATION ISSUES Do NOT ARISE UNDER SECTION 
621(a)(2) BECAUSE No TAKING OCCURS WHEN THE CO-USE AT 
ISSUE INVOLVES EXISTING, COMPATIBLE EASEMENTS 
The few courts that have discussed just compensation in con-
nection with § 621(a)(2) have been forced into the topic by their 
failure to realize that no "taking" is involved when a compatible 
co-use is being made of an existing, private easement. 78 
It is thus worth observing that developers' continued reliance 
on Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.79 is 
misplaced. Besides being an inapposite noneasement case, 
Loretto is inapplicable because its "very narrow" holding80 was 
75. 867 F.2d 151, 156 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
76. "[T]he Woolley plaintiff was seeking access ... where no easement existed." 
Media General Cable u. Sequoyah Condominium Council or Co-Owners, 721 F. Supp. 
775,782(E.D.Va. 1989~ 
77. D. Brenner & M. Price, Cable Teleuision and Other Nonbroadcast Video, § 3.03, 
3-25 (1985) (emphasis added). 
78. Saluaty u. Falcon Cable Teleuision, 165 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803-05 (1985). 
79. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
80. Id. at 441. 
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based on "a historically rooted expectation of compensation. "SI 
At least since the 1984 Cable Act and Salvaty (which distin-
guishedLoretto), those who would limit § 621(a)(2) have had no 
expectation of compensation, historically rooted or otherwise. 
G. IN ALL EVENTS, SECTION 621(a)(2) DOES PROVIDE FOR JUST 
COMPENSATION, SHOULD THE NEED EVER ARISE 
Since co-use of compatible, private easements does not 
constitute a taking, there is no need to reach issues about 
whether § 621(a)(2) provides for just compensation. However, 
should the need ever arise in a given, unique case, it is clear 
that § 621(a)(2) does authorize and provide for just compen-
sation. A comparison of § 621(a)(2) with former § 633 reveals 
the source of this authorization. 
Former § 633(b)(1)(C) was the provision that authorized just 
compensation. S2 Former Subsection D invited local authorities 
to devise methods for determining the just compensation which 
Subsection C authorized. Section 621(a)(2) had always cross-
referenced Subsection C, and Subsection C was formally trans-
ferred to § 621(a)(2) when § 633 was deleted from the Act 
before its enactment. S3 There can thus be no serious argument 
that § 621(a)(2) does not authorize just compensation, should 
such compensation ever be appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been seen, § 621(a)(2) is an important federal refine-
ment and regulation of cable franchisees' established right to 
co-use compatible, private easements. Notwithstanding the 
objections oflandowner interests, the federal courts should be lib-
eral in applying § 621(a)(2) so that congressional policies favor-
ing the growth and expansion of the cable television media are 
fully advanced. 
81. [d. 
82. See, e.g., § 633(b)(1)(C) [see footnote 17, supra]; Eyde, supra note 44. 
83. Landowner interests have attached significance to the fact that Subsection 
D was not also transferred. However, the fate of Subsection D is not relevant. 
Subsection D was never the section authorizing just compensation. Subsection D dealt 
only with calculation methodologies, and did not need to be transferred to a section 
dealing with easements, where such methodologies, if they are ever needed, are 
already well established. 
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